

# Cyprien Batut

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## PERSONAL INFORMATION

Citizenship: French  
Languages: French (native), English (fluent), German & Italian (beginner)

### Office Contact Information

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75014, Paris, France

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## RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary Fields: Labor Economics, Public Economics  
Secondary Field: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics

## DOCTORAL STUDIES

Paris School of Economics, EHESS

2016-2020  
(projected)

PhD, Economics

*Dissertation:* Four essays on the economics of firms

## REFERENCES

### PSE Placement Officer

Professor David Margolis  
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## PRIOR EDUCATION

M.Phil., Economics, Paris School of Economics, *highest distinction*  
CPGE B/l, Lycée Carnot, Dijon

2014-2015  
2010-2013

<b>TEACHING EXPERIENCE</b>	Statistical Reasoning (Graduate)	Sciences Po, Paris	2018
	Public Economics (Graduate)	Sciences Po, Paris	2017
	Macroeconomics (Undergraduate)	Paris 1 University	2016/2017
<b>RELEVANT POSITIONS</b>	Organization of the Applied Economic Seminar (PSE)	France	2017-2020
	World Bank Short Term consultant, DIME	France	2016-2017
	Research Assistant to Professors Sylvie Lambert & Karen Macours	France	2015
	Research Assistant to Professor Denis Cogneau	France	2015
	Intern, Innovation for Poverty Action	Senegal	2014
<b>FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS</b>	Chaire Travail Scholarship		2020
	PhD Full Scholarship - LABEX OSE		2016-2019
<b>PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>Conferences, Workshops and External Seminar Presentations:</b>		
	EBE Summer Meeting		2020
	EEA-ESEM Annual Conference, Applied Economics Seminar (PSE), Labor and Public Economic Seminar (PSE)		2019
	Labor and Public Economic Seminar (PSE)		2018
	<b>Referee:</b> <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> , <i>Journal d'Economie Publique</i>		

**RESEARCH  
PAPERS**

**“Rival Guests or Defiant Hosts? The Economic Impact of Refugee Centers”**, with Sarah Schneider-Strawczynski, PSE

**JOB MARKET PAPER**

This paper investigates the local economic cost of hosting refugees. Using administrative data in France, we show that the opening of small housing centers for refugees decreases the economic activity in hosting municipalities. We demonstrate that this downturn is related to a decline in the population by around two percentage points due to fewer people moving into hosting municipalities. This avoidance behavior of natives results from prejudices since the inflows of refugees are too small to disrupt economic activity. We also estimate the aggregate cost of hosting refugees.

**“From Ultima Ratio to Mutual Consent: The Effects of Changing Employment Protection Doctrine”**, with Eric Maurin, PSE, EHESS

In many countries, the termination of employment contracts has to be either on employer initiative or on employee initiative. Furthermore, the cost of the procedure is borne mainly by the contracting party who takes the initiative and there is little room for sharing costs. The implicit doctrine is that employment termination has to be the last resort, the ultima ratio. In 2008, the French government initiated a change in doctrine: it became possible to terminate employment contracts by mutual consent, at lower costs. Building on firm-level data, we develop an event analysis which reveals that the reform was followed by a decline in dismissals as well as by a significant rise in overall separation rates. By promoting separation by mutual consent, the reform reduced labor litigation risks, boosted workers' flows, but, eventually, we do not detect any effect on firms' employment levels.

**“Labor Market Concentration and Stayers' Wages: Evidence from France”**, with Eve Caroli, Universite Paris Dauphine & Andrea Bassanini, IZA research fellow

We investigate the impact of labor market concentration on stayers' wages, where stayers are defined as individuals who remain employed in the same establishment for at least two years. Using administrative data for France, we show that the elasticity of stayers' wages to labor market concentration is about -0.05, after controlling for labor productivity, product market competition and match-specific heterogeneity. Given the strong wage rigidities characterizing the French labor market, this estimate can be considered a lower bound of the effect of labor market concentration on stayers' wages in an international perspective.

**RESEARCH IN  
PROGRESS****“Subsidizing Adjustment Or Reducing Labor Costs? Evidence From A Hiring Credit In France”**

This article study the implementation of a hiring credit aimed at small firms in France (“l’Aide au Très Petites Entreprises” or ATPE) from December 2008 to July 2010. Using administrative data linking employees and employers and by comparing eligible and ineligible firms following the introduction of the credit, it was possible to estimate the effect of this credit on employment growth and labour flows. The premium has had a positive effect on employment, mainly due to an increase in recruitment. Created jobs are not transitory and survive the application of the credit. This means that the credit has allowed firms to overcome a hiring barrier in a very uncertain environment where it can be magnified by an implicit risk premium. In 2012, the cost per job created for the public authority is less than a quarter of the private cost of that job.

**“Working Time Legislation and Employment”**, with Alesandro Tondini, European University Institute

Under the impulse of EU Working Time Directive of 1993, several European countries have experienced dramatic reforms in the legislation regulating maximum working hours. Existing studies have exclusively focused on France and Portugal, while a comprehensive, joint evaluation of these reforms in the European case is still lacking. Through several legislative databases, we have collected information on working time regulations for all current EU countries over the past 30 years, including the year and magnitude of each reform (if any). We combine this with sector-level data on employment, working hours, wages and productivity, and micro-level data from the EU labor force surveys. Our identification exploits the interaction between changes in national legislation and sector-level bindingness to approximate a causal impact. Preliminary analysis shows evidence of a prevailing work-sharing mechanism at play. As expected, these reforms are associated with less working hours on average, but not more employment. We find no significant impact on productivity per hour worked, nor on wages.

**OTHER  
WRITINGS****Non-Academic**

“Lavorare meno, lavorare tutti” sogno o realtà?, *La Voce.info*, 16/04/2019, with Andrea Garnero and Alesandro Tondini.

”Pour une géopolitique de l’euro”, *Question d’Europe n°506*, Fondation Robert Schuman, 11/03/2019, with Olivier Lenoir.

Articles on *Le Grand Continent.eu*: <https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/staff/cyprien-batut/>