

Paris School of Economics – Master APE and PPD – 2023-2024

# Public Economics

## Syllabus

Antoine Bozio, Julien Grenet, Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman

**Lecture period:** First Semester (September-December 2023).

**Lecturers:**

- Antoine Bozio, [antoine.bozio@psemail.eu](mailto:antoine.bozio@psemail.eu)
- Julien Grenet, [julien.grenet@psemail.eu](mailto:julien.grenet@psemail.eu)
- Thomas Piketty, [piketty@psemail.eu](mailto:piketty@psemail.eu)
- Gabriel Zucman, [gabriel.zucman@psemail.eu](mailto:gabriel.zucman@psemail.eu)

**Language of the course:** English.

### Practical Information

**Course timetable:** There will be 36 hours of lectures, split into 24 sessions of 90 minutes, on Tuesday and Wednesday from 9:15am to 10:45am.

**Lecture's room:** Campus Jourdan – R2-21.

**Course website:** <https://teaching.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/course/81>

### Content

The objective of this course is to present an introduction to public economics, with special emphasis on the history of taxation, public spending and state formation, normative theories of government intervention and redistribution, and the incidence of tax and transfer policies, both in developed countries and in the developing world.

### Related Courses at PSE

- **Introduction to Economic History** (Thomas Piketty): for an introduction to economic history, with emphasis on capital accumulation, inequality and growth.
- **Ageing and Public Policy** (Antoine Bozio): for a more advanced course on the economics of pensions.

# Requirements and Assessment

To validate the course, students are required to:

1. attend all lectures and actively participate in class;
2. submit three problem sets in tutorials, one of the three being randomly selected and marked;
3. take the exam.

The reading list contains many references (particularly regarding the history of taxation, theories of justice, and optimal taxation). The aim is to provide an introduction to the existing literature for students who plan to specialize in these areas. You are not expected to read everything!

You should read at least the “highly recommended readings” (denoted by a \*), as well as a selection of books and articles based on your own tastes. But please read!

The exam will be based upon a good working knowledge of all the material that is presented in the lecture slides. Please ask during the classes if there is anything unclear in this material.

## General References

### Undergraduate-level textbooks

Gruber (2016), Rosen & Galer (2008) and Stiglitz & Gayer (2015) are three good undergraduate-level textbooks in public finance. Gruber (2016) is highly recommended, as it puts more emphasis on empirical work.

- Gruber, J. (2016). *Public Finance and Public Policy*, 5th edition, Worth Publishers.
- Rosen, H. and Gayer, T. (2014). *Public Finance*, 10th edition, McGraw-Hill.
- Stiglitz, J. and Rosengard, J. (2015). *Economics of the Public Sector*, 4th edition, W. W. Norton & Company.

### Graduate-level books

A classic advanced textbook on the economics of taxation is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), dated but still very good; it has recently been reprinted (2015). Kaplow (2008) presents an integrated view of tax policy applying the ideas of optimal taxation to a range of policy questions. Myles (2008) offers a more detailed graduate-level presentation of the theory of public economics. Salanié (2011) is a good short technical and more modern alternative, with a focus on optimal taxation. Mirrlees et al. (2010a and 2010b) present a thorough literature review of the theory and empirics of taxation, with a focus on the U.K institutional design.

- Atkinson, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1980), *Lectures on Public Economics*, McGraw-Hill ; reprinted by Princeton University Press (2015).
- Kaplow, L. (2008). *The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics*, Princeton University Press.
- Mirrlees et al. (2010a), *Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review*, Oxford University Press. [\[link\]](#)
- Mirrlees et al. (2010b), *Tax By Design: The Mirrlees Review*, Oxford University Press. [\[link\]](#)
- Myles, G. (2008). *Public Economics*, Cambridge University Press. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Salanié, B. (2011), *The Economics of Taxation*, MIT Press [Older French version *Théorie économique de la fiscalité*, Economica, 2002].

## Handbooks

Besides the public finance textbooks, the series of *Handbook of Public Economics* are a must-read for graduate students in public economics. There are currently five published volumes, each including widely-quoted chapters:

- Auerbach, A. and Feldstein M. (1985). *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 1, Elsevier. [\[link\]](#)
- Auerbach, A. and Feldstein M. (1987). *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 2, Elsevier. [\[link\]](#)
- Auerbach, A. and Feldstein M. (2002). *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 3, Elsevier. [\[link\]](#)
- Auerbach, A. and Feldstein M. (2002). *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 4, Elsevier. [\[link\]](#)
- Auerbach, A., Chetty, R., Feldstein M. and Saez, E. (2013). *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 5, Elsevier. [\[link\]](#)

## Course Outline and References

### 1.A Introduction to Public Economics (AB, September 12)

- [Atkinson and Stiglitz], chap 1 and 11.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review*, 91(5), pp. 1369-1401. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Adema, W., Fron, P. and Ladaïque, M. (2011). “Is the European Welfare State Really More Expensive? Indicators on Social Spending, 1980-2012; and a Manual to the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX),” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 124. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Delalande, N. (2011). *Les batailles de l'impôt: consentement et résistance de 1789 à nos jours*, Le Seuil.
- Dreze, J. (1995). “Forty Years of Public Economics: A Personal Perspective,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9(2), pp. 111–130. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Castles, F., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., Obinger, H. and Pierson, C. (eds.) (2010). *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, Oxford University Press.
- Greif, A. (1993). “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” *American Economic Review*, 83(3), pp. 525-548. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Kleven, H. (2014). “How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28(4), pp. 77–98. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kleven, H., Kreiner, C. and Saez, E. (2016). “Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries,” *Economica* 83 (330): 219–246. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Lindert, P. (2004). *Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, I., Merhotra, A. and Pasad, M. (2009). *The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press.
- \* Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Harvard University Press, chap. 13. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Rosanvallon, P. (2015). *Le bon gouvernement*, Le Seuil.
- Tanzi, V. and Schuknecht, L. (2000). *Public Spending in the 20th Century. A Global Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (chapter I). [\[pdf\]](#)

## 1.B Tools of Welfare Analysis (JG, September 13)

- [Atkinson and Stiglitz], chap. 6, 7 and 11.
- [Gruber], chap. 2, 3, 19 and 20.
- [Rosen and Gayer], chap. 3 and 18.
- [Stiglitz and Rosengard], chap. 3 and 4.
- \* Auerbach, A. (1985). “The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation,” in Auerbach, A. and Feldstein, M. (eds) *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 3., chap. 2. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Carbonnier, C. (2007). “Who Pays Sales Taxes? Evidence from French VAT Reforms, 1987–1999,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 91(5-6), pp. 1219–29. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Cohen, P., Hahn, R., Hall, J., Levitt, S. and Metcalfe, R. (2016). “Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber,” NBER Working Paper No. 22627. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Fullerton, D. and Metcalf, G. (2002). “Tax Incidence,” in Auerbach, A. and Feldstein, M. (eds), *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 4., chap. 26. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Glaeser, E. and Luttmer, E. (2003). “The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control,” *American Economic Review*, 93(4), pp. 1027–1046. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Hines, J. (1999), “Three Sides of Harberger Triangles,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13(2), pp. 167–188. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kotlikoff, L. and Summers, L. (1987), “Tax Incidence” in Auerbach, A. and Feldstein, M. (eds) *Handbook of Public Economics*, North Holland, Vol. 2, pp. 1043–92. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Marion, J. and Muehlegger, E. (2008). “Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(4), pp. 633–666. [\[pdf\]](#)

## 2. Externalities (JG, September 19 and 20)

- [Gruber], chap. 5, 6 and 8.
- [Rosen and Gayer], chap. 5.
- [Stiglitz and Rosengard], chap. 6.
- Brookshire, D., Thayer, M., Schulze, W. and d’Arge, R. (1982). “Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Survey and Hedonic Approaches,” *American Economic Review*, 72(1), pp. 165–177. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Bruvold, A. and Larsen, B. (2004). “Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Norway: do Carbon Taxes Work?,” *Energy Policy*, 32(4), pp. 493–505. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Chancel, L. and Piketty, T. (2015). “Carbon and Inequality: from Kyoto to Paris. Trends in the Global Inequality of Carbon Emissions (1998–2013) and Prospects for an Equitable Adpatation Fund,” PSE working paper. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Chay, K. and Greenstone, M. (2005). “Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence from the Housing Market,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(2), pp. 376–424. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Coase, R. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost,” *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3, pp. 1–44. [\[pdf\]](#)

- Currie, J., Davis, L., Greenstone, M. and Walker, E. (2015). “Environmental Health Risks and Housing Values: Evidence from 1,600 Toxic Plant Openings and Closings,” *American Economic Review*, 105(2), pp. 678–709. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Diamond, P. and Hausman, J. (1994). “Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 8, pp. 45–64. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Fullerton, D. (2011). “Six Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy,” *Risk Analysis*, 31(6), pp. 923–929. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Linden, L. and Rockoff, J. (2008). “Estimates of the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values from Megan’s Laws,” *American Economic Review*, 98(3), pp. 1103–1127. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Metcalf, G. (2009). “Market-Based Policy Options to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 23(2), pp. 5–27. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Moretti, E. and Neidell, M. (2011). “Pollution, Health, and Avoidance Behavior: Evidence from the Ports of Los Angeles,” *Journal of Human Resources*, 46(1), pp. 154–175. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Weitzman, M. (1974). “Prices vs. Quantities,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 41(4), pp. 477–491. [\[pdf\]](#)

### 3. Public Goods (JG, September 26 and 27)

- [Atkinson and Stiglitz], chap 16.
- [Gruber], chap. 7 and 9.
- [Rosen and Gayer], chap. 4.
- [Stiglitz and Rosengard], chap. 5.
- Andreoni, J. (1988). “Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 37, pp. 291–304. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Andreoni, J. (1990). “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giving,” *Economic Journal*, 100, pp. 464–477. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Andreoni, J. (1993). “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis,” *American Economic Review*, 83(5), pp. 1317–1327. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Andreoni, J. and Payne, A. (2003). “Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fundraising?,” *American Economic Review*, 93(3), pp. 792–812. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Andreoni, J. and Payne, A. (2011). “Is Crowding Out due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(5-6), pp. 334–343. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Arrow, K. (1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*, Yale University Press. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Atkinson, A. and Stern, N. (1974). “Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 41(1), pp. 119–128. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Bergstrom, T., Blume, L. and Varian, H. (1986). “On the Private Provision of Public Goods,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 29, pp. 25–49. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kingma, B. (1989). “An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-Out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 97, pp. 1197–1207. [\[pdf\]](#)

- \* Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000). “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,” *American Economic Review*, 90(4), pp. 980–994. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Herrmann, B., Thöni, C. and Gächter, S. (2008). “Antisocial Punishment Across Societies,” *Science*, 319(5868), pp. 1362–1367. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Hungerman, D. (2005). “Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 89, pp. 2245–67. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Isaac, R., McCue, K. and Plott, C. (1985). “Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 26(1), pp. 51–74. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Johansen, L. (1963). “Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Determination of Public Expenditures,” *International Economic Review*, 4(3), pp. 346–358. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Lindahl, E. (1919). *Positive Lösung: Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung*, Lund. Reprinted as “Just Taxation: A Positive Solution”, in Musgrave, R., and Peacock, A. (eds), *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1958, pp. 168–176. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Marwell, G. and Ames, R. (1981). “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 15, pp. 295–310. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Miguel, E. and Gugerty, M. (2005). “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(11-12), pp. 2325–68. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Roberts, R. (1984). “A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 92(1), pp. 136–148. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Samuelson, P. (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36(4), pp. 387–389. [\[pdf\]](#)

#### 4. Taxation of Goods and Services (AB, October 3 and 4)

- [Atkinson and Stiglitz], chap. 6, 7 and 12.
- [Salanié], chap. 3.
- Besley, T. and Rosen, H. (1999). “Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis,” *National Tax Journal*, 52(2), pp. 157–178. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Benzarti, Y., and Carloni, D. (2019). “Who Really Benefits From Consumption Tax Cuts? Evidence From a Large VAT Cut in France”, *AEJ: Economic Policy*, 11(1), pp. 38–63.
- \* Benzarti, Y., Carloni, D., Harju, J. and Kosonen, T. (2020). “What Goes Up May Not Come Down: Asymmetric Incidence of Value Added Taxes,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(12), pp. 4438–4474. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Carbonnier, C. (2007). “Who Pays Sales Taxes? Evidence from French VAT Reforms, 1987–1999,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 91(5-6), pp. 1219–29. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Crawford, I., Keen, M. and Smith, S. (2010). “Value-Added Tax and Excise,” in Mirrlees et al. (eds), *Dimensions of Tax Design: the Mirrlees Review*, Oxford University Press, chap. 4. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Chetty, R., Looney, A. and Kroft, K. (2009). “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence,” *American Economic Review*, 99(4), pp. 1145–77. [\[pdf\]](#)

- Corlett, W. and Hague, D. (1953). “Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 21(1), pp. 21–30. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Diamond, P. (1975). “A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 4(4), pp. 335–342. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Keen, M. (2007). “VAT Attacks!,” *International Tax and Public Finance*, 14(4), pp. 365–381. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kosonen, T. (2015). “More and Cheaper Haircuts after VAT Cut? On the Efficiency and Incidence of Service Sector Consumption Taxes,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 131, pp. 87–100. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kopczuk, W., Marion, J., Muehlegger, E. and Slemrod, J. (2016). “Does Tax-Collection Invariance Hold? Evasion and the Pass-through of State Diesel Taxes,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 8(2), pp. 251–286. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Laroque, G. (2005). “Indirect Taxation is Superfluous under Separability and Taste Homogeneity: A Simple Proof,” *Economic Letters*, 87, pp. 141–144. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Pomeranz, D. (2015). “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax,” *American Economic Review*, 105(8), pp. 2539–69. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Ramsey, F. (1927). “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” *Economic Journal*, 37(145), pp. 47–51. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Saez, E. (2002). “The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 83, pp. 217–230. [\[pdf\]](#)

## 5. Labour Income Taxation (1) (AB, October 10 and 11)

- Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2005). “Work and Leisure in the United States and Europe: Why So Different?,” *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 20, pp. 1–64. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Atkinson, A., Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2011). “Top Incomes in the Long Run of History”, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(1), pp. 3–71. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Bianchi, M., Gudmundsson, B. and Zoega, G. (2001). “Iceland’s Natural Experiment in Supply-Side Economics,” *The American Economic Review* 91(5), pp. 1564–79. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Blau, F. and Kahn, L. (2007). “Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of Married Women: 1980-2000,” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 25(3), pp. 393–438. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Blundell, R., Bozio, A. and Laroque, G. (2011). “Labour Supply and the Extensive Margin,” *American Economic Review*, 101(3), pp. 482–486. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Blundell, R. and MaCurdy, T. (1999). “Labor Supply: a Review of Alternative Approaches,” in Ashenfelter, O., and Card, D. (eds), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, vol. 3A, chap. 27, Elsevier. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Bozio, A., Breda, T. and Julien Grenet, G. (2019) “Does Tax-Benefit Linkage Matter for the Incidence of Social Security Contributions?,” PSE working paper 1943, IZA DP No. 12502.
- \* Chetty, R., Friedman, J., Olsen, T. and Pistaferri, L. (2011). “Adjustment Costs, Firms Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(2), pp. 749–804. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Eissa, N. and Hoynes, H. (2004). “Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of Married Couples: the Earned Income Tax Credit,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 88, pp. 1931–1958. [\[pdf\]](#)

- Eissa, N. and Liebman, J. (1996). “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111(2), pp. 605–637. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kleven, H. and Waseem, M. (2013). “Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), pp. 669–723. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Mankiw, G. and Weinzierl, M. (2010). “The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2(1), pp. 155–176. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Martinez, I., Saez, E. and Siegenthaler, M. (2021). “Intertemporal Labor Supply Substitution? Evidence from the Swiss Income Tax Holidays”, *American Economic Review* 111(2), pp. 506–546.
- Prescott, E. (2004), “Why Do Americans Work so Much More than Europeans?,” *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review*, 28(1), pp. 2–13. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Saez, E. (2010). “Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2, pp. 180–212. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Saez, E., Matsaganis, M. and Tsakloglou, P. (2012), “Earnings Determination and Taxes: Evidence From a Cohort-Based Payroll Tax Reform in Greece,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(1), pp. 493–533. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Saez, E., Schoefer, B. and Seim, D. (2019) “Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden” *American Economic Review* Vol. 109, No. 5, pp. 1717-63.
- \* Saez, E., Slemrod, J. and Giertz, S. (2012). “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 50(1), pp. 3–50. [\[pdf\]](#)

## 6. Labour Income Taxation (2) (AB, October 17 and 18)

- [Salanié], chap. 4 and 9.
- Akerlof, G. (1978). “The Economics of ‘Tagging’ as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax,” *American Economic Review*, 68, pp. 8–19. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1992). “Workfare versus Welfare: Incentives Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 82, pp. 249–261. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Chetty, R., Friedman, J. and Saez, E. (2013) “Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings”, *The American Economic Review* 103 (7): 2683–2721.
- Brewer, M., Saez, E. and Shephard, A. (2010). “Means Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings,” in Mirrlees et al. (eds), *Dimensions of Tax Design: the Mirrlees Review*, Oxford University Press, chap. 2. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Diamond, P. and Saez, E. (2011). “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25(4), pp. 165–190. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Feldstein, M. (1995). “The Effects of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 103(3), pp. 551–572. [\[pdf\]](#)



- Feldstein, M. (1999), “Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81(4), pp. 674–680. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Goolsbee, A. (1999). “Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1999(2), pp. 1–64. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Gruber, J. and Saez, E. (2002). “The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 84, pp. 1–32. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Hoynes, H. and Patel, A. (2017) “Effective Policy for Reducing Poverty and Inequality? The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Distribution of Income”, *Journal of Human Resources*, 1115-7494R1.
- Kleven, H., Landais, C. and Saez, E. (2013). “Taxation and International Migration of Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigner Tax Scheme in Denmark,” *American Economic Review*, 103(5), pp. 1892–1924. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kleven, H. and Schultz, E. (2014), “Estimating Taxable Income Responses using Danish Tax Reforms”, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6(4), pp. 271–301. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kleven, H., Kreiner, C. and Saez, E. (2009). “The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples,” *Econometrica*, 77, pp. 537–560. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Lehmann, E., Simula, L. and Trannoy, A. (2014). “Tax Me if You Can! Optimal Non-linear Income Tax between Competing Governments,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4), pp. 1995–2030. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Lundberg, S., Pollak, R. and Wales, T. (1997). “Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit,” *Journal of Human Resources*, 32(3), pp. 463–480. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Moffitt, R. (2002). “Welfare Programs and Labor Supply,” in Auerbach, A. and Feldstein, M. (eds), *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 4, chap. 34, Elsevier. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Mirrlees J. (1971). “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 38(2), pp. 175–208. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Piketty, T. (1997). “La redistribution fiscale face au chômage,” *Revue française d’économie*, 12, pp. 157–201. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2013), “Optimal Labor Income Taxation,” in Auerbach, A., Chetty, R., Feldstein, M. and Saez, E. (eds), *Handbook of Public Economics*, vol. 5, chap. 7, Elsevier. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Piketty, T., Saez, E. and Stantcheva, S. (2014). “Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities,” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6(1), pp. 230–271. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Saez E. (2001). “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 68, pp. 205–229. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Saez E. (2002). “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(3), pp. 1039–1073. [\[pdf\]](#)

## 7. Normative and Intertemporal Theories of Social and Fiscal Justice (TP, October 24 and 25)

- [Atkinson and Stiglitz], chap. 10.
- Arrow, K. (1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*, Yale University Press. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kuziemko, L., Norton, M., Saez, E. and Stantcheva, S. (2015). “How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution?,” *American Economic Review*, 105(4), pp. 1478–1508. [\[pdf\]](#)
- Kymlicka, W. (2002). *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press.
- \* Piketty, T. (1995). “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), pp. 551–584. [\[pdf\]](#)
- \* Piketty, T. (1999). “The Information-Aggregation Approach to Political Institutions,” *European Economic Review*, 43, pp. 791–800. [\[pdf\]](#)
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