

## *Curriculum Vitae*

### **Olivier COMPTE**

Address : PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France ; Email : compte@enpc.fr

**Education :** Ecole Polytechnique, 1984-87 ; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 1987-89 ; Ph. D Stanford, 1994: "Private Observations, Communications and Coordination in Repeated Games"

**Employer:** Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées (since 1994), Economic Theory Chair at Paris School of Economics (PSE)

**Research:** auctions, bargaining, repeated games, matching, economics and psychology, bounded rationality, decision theory

**Teaching Experience:** Micro-economics at various institutions (ENPC, ENSAE, Ecole Polytechnique, Stanford (teaching assistant), Game theory (M1, APE), Bargaining (M2, APE), Plausible theories of behavior (M2, APE) Bounded rationality and behavioral economics (M2 APE)

**Editorship:** Journal of Economic Theory (associate editor, 2004-13) Theoretical Economics (2008-2011)

**Distinction:** Elected Fellow of The Econometric Society. Elected at the council of the Game Theory Society

### **Contractual Activity :**

*European commission:* CO2 permit auctions design (phase III of EU ETS)

*ACOSS (French social security):* Auctions design for financial services.

*Criteo:* market place design.

### **Published papers.**

[1] International negotiations and dispute resolution mechanisms: the case of environmental negotiations (co-authored with Philippe Jehiel) (1997) in *International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues* ed. Carlo Carraro Edward Elgar.

[2] Communication in Repeated games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (*Econometrica*, may 1998, p.597-626).

[3] Bargaining while Searching for Outside Options: A Potential Role for Unions, (joint with Philippe Aghion and Philippe Jehiel) *European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* (1998).

[4] On Failing to Cooperate when Monitoring is Private, (2002) *Journal of Economic Theory*

[5] Collusion, Mergers and Capacity Constraints, (2002) (joint with Frédéric Jenny and Patrick Rey), *European Economic Review* ,46, 1-29

[6] On the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), *Econometrica*.

[7] On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), *Econometrica*

[8] On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations, (2002) *Journal of Economic Theory*

- [9] Voluntary Contributions to a joint Project : The asymmetric case, (2003) *Journal of Economic Theory*
- [10] Corruption and Competition in Procurement (joint with Ariane Lambert and Thierry Verdier) (2004) *Rand Journal of Economics*
- [11] Confidence enhanced performance (joint with Andrew Postlewaite), 2004, *American Economic Review*
- [12] Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution games (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2004, *Review of Economic Studies*
- [13] The Wait and See Option in Ascending Auctions (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2004, *Journal of the European Economic Association*
- [14] Gathering Information before Signing a Contract : A Screening Perspective (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2007 *International Journal of Industrial Organization*
- [15] On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2007 *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*.
- [16] Auctions and Information acquisition : Sealed-bid or dynamic formats ? (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2007, *Rand Journal of Economics*.
- [17] Veto constraint in Mechanism design: Inefficiency with correlated types (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2008, *American Economic Journal: Micro*.
- [18] Bargaining and Majority Rules: A collective search Perspective (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2010, *Journal of Political Economy*
- [19] The coalitional Nash bargaining Solution (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2010, *Econometrica*
- [20] Plausible Cooperation (joint with Andy Postlewaite), 2015, *Games and Economic Behavior*
- [21] Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling (joint with Laurent Lamy and Emmanuel Laurent), 2016, *Revue Economique*

### **Working papers.**

- [1] On the role of arbitration in negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [2] When outside options force concessions to be gradual (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [3] Multi-party negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel),
- [4] Secret Price Cutting : an illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic
- [5] The winner's curse with independent private values
- [6] Credible Threats, Reputation and Private Monitoring.
- [7] Prediction errors and the winner's curse.
- [8] Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [9] Repeated games with limited information processing (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [10] Plausible cooperation (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [11] Mental processes and decision making (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [12] Simple Auctions (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [13] Voluntary Participation and Reassignment in Two-sided Matching (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [14] On the Optimal Majority Rule (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [15] Group Decisions (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [16] Folk Theorems (joint with Andy Postlewaite)
- [17] Belief free Equilibria (joint with Andy Postlewaite)
- [18] All pay auctions.
- [19] Information Aggregation: Auctions.