

# International Trade, Technology, and the Skill Premium

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# Introduction

- What are consequences of  $\Downarrow$  in trade costs for *skill premium*?
- Two mechanisms linking  $\Delta\text{trade}$  to  $\Delta s/w$ 
  - ▶ Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O)
  - ▶ Skill-biased technology
- Embed into otherwise standard quantitative trade model
- Discipline key parameters: firm-level skill intensity & other facts
- No analytic gravity — alternative approach to match bilateral trade
- Counterfactuals:  $\Downarrow$  trade costs, China growth, skill-biased tech  $\Delta$
- Revisit previous approaches: underestimate role of trade on  $s/w$

Model

## Technologies

- Consumption in merchandise and services
- Merchandise and services each aggregator over sectors  $j$
- Each sector aggregate of a continuum of varieties  $(\omega, j)$
- Within each variety, 2 potential producers x country, Bertrand
- Iceberg transport cost  $\tau_{in} \geq 1$  of shipping from  $i$  to  $n$

# Firms

## Production function

- Country  $n$  firm in  $(\omega, j)$  with productivity  $z$  produces

$$y = A_n(j) \left[ \alpha_j^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (z^{2\phi} h)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + (1 - \alpha_j)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (z^{2(1-\phi)} l)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right]^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$$

- ▶  $\alpha_j$  determines relative importance of skilled labor in sector  $j$
- ▶  $A_n(j)$  Hicks-neutral sectoral TFP
  - ★  $A_n(j) = T_n \times T_n(j)$
- ▶  $\phi$  determines skill bias of technology
- ▶  $z = u^{-\theta}$ , where  $u \sim \exp(1)$

# Firms

## Skill bias of technology

$$\frac{h}{l} = \left( \frac{w_i}{s_i} \right)^{\rho} \frac{\alpha_j}{1 - \alpha_j} z^{\varphi}$$

- $\varphi \equiv 2(2\phi - 1)(\rho - 1)$  skill-bias of technology
  - ▶ if  $\varphi = 0$  we say technology is Hicks neutral
  - ▶ if  $\varphi > 0$  we say technology is skill biased
- Two ways reallocation affects demand for skill
  - 1 Across firms between sectors
  - 2 Across firms within sectors

# Firms

## Skill bias of technology

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- Two ways reallocation affects demand for skill
  - 1 Across firms between sectors
  - 2 Across firms within sectors
- In an extension, we allow H-O to be active within sectors

# General equilibrium

- Goods-market clearing

$$y_i(\omega, j) = \sum_n \tau_{in} q_n(\omega, j) \mathbb{I}_{in}(\omega, j)$$

- Factor-market clearing with inelastic supplies  $H_i$  and  $L_i$

$$L_i = \sum_j \int_0^1 l_i(\omega, j) d\omega \text{ and } H_i = \sum_j \int_0^1 h_i(\omega, j) d\omega$$

- Trade imbalances (where  $NX_i$  are net exports in  $i$ )

$$P_i Q_i = (s_i H_i + w_i L_i + \Pi_i) \left( 1 - \frac{NX_i}{Output_i} \right)$$

- We treat  $NX_i / Output_i$  as a parameter

- Also consider no labor mobility between merchandise & service sectors



# Parameterization

## Connecting model and data

- 64 countries + rest of the world ROW (aggregate of 89 countries)
  - ▶ 64 countries account for approx 93% of world GDP
- Data averaged over 2005-2007 (if possible)
- Skilled worker: completed tertiary degree (i.e. in US, college degree)
- 98 merchandise sectors = goods producing industries
- 155 services industries include construction, exclude government

## Parameterization basics

- Parameters assigned directly from data
  - ▶  $H_n / (H_n + L_n) = \%$  with tertiary degree from Barro Lee
  - ▶  $\alpha_j = \%$  w/ tertiary degree in US, American Community Survey
- $\sigma = \eta$  median 5-digit SITC, Broda Weinstein
- Choose  $T_n, \tau_{in}$  to match relative country size and bilateral trade
- $\rho, \theta, \varphi, t_n$  to target specific moments

## Target moment 1

- Aggregate elasticity of substitution btw  $H_{US}$  and  $L_{US}$  in US,  $\hat{\rho} = 1.6$ 
  - ▶ Katz and Murphy 92 estimate elasticity = 1.4
  - ▶ Acemoglu and Autor 10 estimate elasticity  $\in [1.6, 1.8]$
- In baseline parameterization, we  $\uparrow H_{US}$  by 10% and calculate

$$\hat{\rho} = \Delta \left[ \log \left( \frac{H_{US}}{L_{US}} \right) / \log \left( \frac{w_{US}}{s_{US}} \right) \right]$$

- If  $\varphi = 0$  and only one sector  $\Rightarrow \hat{\rho} = \rho$
- With  $\varphi > 0$  and many sectors  $\Rightarrow \rho = 1.4$

## Target moment 2

- Elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade cost,  $\hat{\varepsilon} = 5$ 
  - ▶ Eaton and Kortum 2002 preferred estimate 8.28
  - ▶ Donaldson 2010 preferred estimate 4
  - ▶ Simonovska and Waugh 2011 estimate [2.47, 5.51]
  - ▶ Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2011 preferred estimate 5
  - ▶ Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer 2012 preferred estimate 6.53
- Run a gravity equation on data generated by our model

$$\log (Exp_{in}) = Importer_n FE + Exporter_i FE - \hat{\varepsilon} \ln \tau_{in}$$

- If  $\varphi = 0 \Rightarrow \theta = 1/\hat{\varepsilon}$
- With  $\varphi > 0 \Rightarrow \theta = 0.25$

## Target moment 3

$$\log \left[ \frac{h_i}{h_i + l_i} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log sales_i + IndustryFE_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- In Mexico,  $\beta_1 = 0.136$ ; unreported result from Verhoogen (2008)
  - ▶ 1998 *Encuesta Industrial Anual* (EIA) w/ large manufacturing plants
- In the model:  $\varphi = 0 \Rightarrow \beta_1 = 0$ 
  - ▶  $\beta_1$  is increasing in  $\varphi$

$\varphi$	0	0.08	0.24	<b>0.4</b> ( $\phi = 0.75$ )	0.64	0.72
Elasticity	0	0.05	0.085	<b>0.139</b>	0.213	0.23

- Note: If  $\varphi = 0$  and  $\alpha$ s vary within sector, then elasticity in skill-scarce countries is **negative**

# Target moment 4

Between sector trade patterns

- For each  $n = 1, \dots, 64$ , regress

$$\frac{\text{Net exports}_n(j)}{\text{Exports}_n(j) + \text{Imports}_n(j)} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_n \frac{H_{US}(j)}{H_{US}(j) + L_{US}(j)} + \varepsilon_n(j)$$

# Target moment 4

## Between sector trade patterns

- For each  $n = 1, \dots, 64$ , regress


$$\frac{\text{Net exports}_n(j)}{\text{Exports}_n(j) + \text{Imports}_n(j)} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_n \frac{H_{US}(j)}{H_{US}(j) + L_{US}(j)} + \varepsilon_n(j)$$

- Comparative advantage determined by  $H_n/L_n$  and *relative*  $t_n$ 's in  $T_n(j) = 1 + (\alpha_j - \bar{\alpha}) t_n$
- Alternative 1: Choose  $t_n$  to match  $\beta_n - \sum_i w_i^{\text{out}} \beta_i$
- Alternative 2: Choose  $t_n = 0$  (Morrow 2010)




# Target moment 4

Between sector trade patterns in the data and matched in the model



# Target moment 4

Between sector trade pattern if we do and if we do not target moment 4



## Solution Algorithm

# Solution Algorithm

## Overview of three loops


- Outer loop: iterate over  $\varphi, \theta, \rho$
- Middle loop: iterate over  $\tau_{in}, T_n, t_n$ 
  - ▶ Match  $Exports_{in} / (Out_i + Out_n)$ ,  $Out_n / World Out$ , and target moment 4
  - ▶ Update  $\tau_{in}$  using excess bilateral exports data - model
  - ▶ Update  $T_n$  using excess output<sub>n</sub> data - model
  - ▶ Update  $t_n$  using excess  $\beta_n$  data - model
- Inner loop: iterate over  $w_n, s_n, \pi_n$ 
  - ▶ Extends Alvarez and Lucas
    - ★ no analytic gravity, 2 factors,  $\Pi_n \neq 0$ , & trade imbalances
  - ▶ no proof of uniqueness
  - ▶ numerical demonstration of existence

Moments targeted and not targeted


# Trade flows and output: Data versus model

► To H/L and trade flows


Log bilateral exports




Log output



Imports / output merchandise





Exports / output merchandise



# Gravity

- Plot  $\log [X_{in}X_{ni} / (X_{ij}X_{nn})]$  and  $\log (\tau_{in}\tau_{ni})$

With  $\varphi = 0$ , constant elasticity



# Trade costs

- We project  $\tau_{in}$  onto standard “gravity” variables
  - ▶ distance, distance squared, common language, common border, exporter and importer FEs
    - ★ only using those  $\tau_{ins}$  not set to  $+\infty$

$\Rightarrow R^2 = 0.74$  with expected signs and statistical significance



# Trade costs

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  - ▶ distance, distance squared, common language, common border, exporter and importer FEs
    - ★ only using those  $\tau_{ins}$  not set to  $+\infty$
- $\Rightarrow R^2 = 0.74$  with expected signs and statistical significance
- Do poor countries face higher export and/or import costs conditioning on other observables?
  - ▶ Regressing importer FEs on importer GDP per capita  $\Rightarrow$  negative coefficient highly significant
  - ▶ Regressing exporter FEs on exporter GDP per capita  $\Rightarrow$  negative coefficient significant at 10% level
- Similar results if we directly include exporter & importer GDP per capita in gravity regression

## Other moments not targeted: Mexico

- Exporter skill-intensity premium, controlling for industry

$$\ln \left[ \frac{h_i}{h_i + l_i} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{Exporter}_i + \textit{IndustryFE}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- ▶ in model  $\beta_1 = 0.25$  in merchandise
- ▶ in data  $\beta_1 = 0.21$ , 1998 EIA unreported from Verhoogen (2008)

## Other moments not targeted: Brazil

- Elasticity of skill intensity to firm  $i$  size controlling for industry

$$\log \left[ \frac{h_i}{h_i + l_i} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log sales_i + IndustryFE_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- ▶ in model  $\beta_1 = 0.24$  in merchandise
- ▶ in data  $\beta_1 = 0.36$ , 1995 *Pesquisa Industrial Anual* (PIA) sample (large manuf firms) unreported from Menezes-Filho et. al. (2008)

- Elasticity of skill intensity to domestic sales controlling for industry

$$\log \left[ \frac{h_i}{h_i + l_i} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log (\text{domestic sales})_i + IndustryFE_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- ▶ in model  $\beta_1 = 0.34$  in merchandise
- ▶ in data  $\beta_1 = 0.34$ , 1995 PIA sample unreported from Menezes-Filho et. al. (2008)

## Other moments not targeted: US

- % of exporters = 0.51 too high, as in **BEJK**
  - ▶ need fixed cost
- However
  - ▶ share of aggregate revenues by exporters
    - ★ in model = 65% in merchandise
    - ★ in data = 60%, 1992 Census of Manuf, **BEJK**
  - ▶ VA per worker exporter premium in US

$$\ln(\text{VA per worker}_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Exporter}_i + \text{IndustryFE}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- ★ in model  $\beta_1 = 0.135$  in merchandise
- ★ in data  $\beta_1 = 0.11$ , 2002 Census of Manuf, Bernard et. al. (2007)

## Other moments not targeted: US

- Exporter skill-intensity premium, controlling for industry

$$\ln \left[ \frac{h_i}{h_i + l_i} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Exporter}_i + \text{IndustryFE}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

- ▶ in model  $\beta_1 = 0.14$  in merchandise
- ▶ in data  $\beta_1 = 0.11$ , 2002 Census of Manuf, Bernard et. al. (2007)
- ▶ Imperfect comparison: Bernard et. al. (2007) use non-production worker share

## Other moments not targeted: US

- Regress  $\frac{\text{Exp}_{US}(j) + \text{Imp}_{US}(j)}{\text{Absorption}_{US}(j)}$  on  $j$  skill intensity in US merchandise  $j$ s
  - ▶ in data, coefficient on skill intensity = 0.70
    - ★ significant at 1% level
    - ★ use BEA's detailed IO tables for 2002 Benchmark
  - ▶ in model, coefficient on skill intensity = 0.88
  - ▶ re-parameterize model imposing  $\phi = 1/2$ , coefficient =  $-0.06$

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- **Intuition:** interaction between the two mechanisms

$\phi > 1/2 \Rightarrow$  unit costs more sensitive to  $z$  in high  $\alpha_j$  sectors

$$\frac{d}{d\alpha_j} \left| \frac{d \log [\text{unit cost}(\omega, j)]}{d \log z} \right| > 0 \Leftrightarrow \phi > 1/2$$

$\Rightarrow$  more dispersed distribution of unit costs in high  $\alpha_j$  sectors

- ▶ even though same distribution of productivities across sectors

$\Rightarrow$  more trade in high  $\alpha_j$  sectors

# Counterfactuals




# Counterfactuals

- Range of counterfactuals:
  - ▶ autarky
  - ▶ 10% reduction in trade costs
  - ▶ Growth in China
    - ★ Both with factor mobility and limited factor mobility, labor fixed in merchandise and services at baseline levels
    - ★ In 10% and China experiments, keep  $(\text{Net Exports})_i / \text{Output}_i$  fixed
  - ▶ Skill-biased technical change
- Revisit previous approaches using data generated by model and show why they would predict small effects of trade


# Real wage changes from autarky to baseline

Large differences in real wage changes across factors




# From autarky to baseline

Change in skill premium vs 2005-07 trade share, correlation = 0.70




# From autarky to baseline

Change in skill premium vs 2005-07 country size, correlation = -0.62




# From autarky to baseline: strength of H-O

Correlation change skill premium & H/L = -0.16




## From autarky to baseline: strength of H-O

No skill bias, low prctivity dispersion,  $\tau_n=0$ : correl change skill premium &  $H/L = 0.75$




# 10% fall in trade costs from baseline parameterization

Skill premium with full and limited mobility



# Three-fold increase in China's TFP

Skill premium change in China's trading partners, with full and limited mobility







# Skill-biased technical change in all countries

s/w rises by 25% in median country

$$\frac{h}{l} = \left( \frac{w_i}{s_i} \right)^\rho \frac{A_h}{A_l} \frac{\alpha_j}{1 - \alpha_j} z^\varphi$$


- Hicks-neutral technology,  $\varphi = 0$ 
  - ▶ Trade share for median country rises by 0.1%
- Skill-biased technology,  $\varphi > 0$ 
  - ▶ Trade share for median country rises by 4.5%
- Skill-biased technical change induces aggregate outcomes that look like reductions in international trade costs
- Intuition: with  $\varphi > 0$ , elasticity of unit costs with respect to productivity  $\uparrow$  if  $A_h/A_l \uparrow$ 
  - ▶ same intuition for why more trade in high  $\alpha_j$  sectors

Other approaches


## Other approaches

- Factor content of trade (FCT)
- Between-sector price changes
- Between-sector factor reallocation


## Standard measure of factor content of trade



## Correct measure of factor content of trade




## Changes in domestic prices by sector



# Between sector factor reallocation

Model's implication for Chile: from autarky to baseline ( $s/w$  rises 7.5%)





# Conclusion

- Embed into otherwise standard quantitative trade model 2 central mechanisms in theoretical and empirical trade literature through which trade shapes skill premium
- Much of gains from trade accrue to skilled labor bc skill premium in most countries in response to changes in trade costs
- Use computational approach to accurately match bilateral exports, does not require analytic gravity at any level of aggregation

## Conclusion

- Embed into otherwise standard quantitative trade model 2 central mechanisms in theoretical and empirical trade literature through which trade shapes skill premium
- Much of gains from trade accrue to skilled labor bc skill premium in most countries in response to changes in trade costs
- Use computational approach to accurately match bilateral exports, does not require analytic gravity at any level of aggregation
- Multinational production is another major form of globalization
  - ▶ MP may strengthen H-O mechanism, high productivity firms can produce in countries with comparative advantage in their sector
  - ▶ MP may strengthen SBT mechanism, promotes international diffusion of best technologies

Sensitivity

## Perfect competition

Same  $\{\rho, \varphi, \theta\}$ , redo middle and inner loops

Move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline	Perfect competition
mean	+8.00	+7.89
max	+19.65	+19.82
min	+2.12	+1.88

## Alternative trade cost parameterization

Same  $\{\rho, \varphi, \theta\}$ , redo middle and inner loops

Move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline	symm trade costs in ROW	symm trade costs in US	symm trade costs in all $n$
mean	+8.00	+8.00	+8.00	+8.08
max	+19.65	+19.63	+19.63	+19.47
min	+2.12	+2.12	+2.12	+2.12

## Sectoral comparative advantage

Same  $\{\rho, \varphi, \theta\}$ , redo middle and inner loops

From 2006 parameterization, move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline	Setting $t_i = 0$
mean	+8.00	+9.27
max	+19.65	+23.23
min	+2.12	+0.81

## Measure of skill endowment

Same  $\{\rho, \varphi, \theta\}$ , redo middle and inner loops

From 2006 parameterization, move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline	$\frac{H_i}{L_i}$ avg yrs of educ.	$\frac{H_i}{L_i}$ avg yrs of educ. and setting $t_i = 0$
mean	+8.00	+7.90	+9.80
max	+19.65	+19.40	+22.63
min	+2.12	+2.01	+1.84

## Skill bias of technology

Same  $\{\rho, \theta\}$ , redo middle and inner loops

From 2006 parameterization, move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline $\varphi = 0.4$	$\varphi = 0$	$\varphi = 0.08$	$\varphi = 0.24$	$\varphi = 0.64$	$\varphi = 0.72$
mean	+8.00	-0.2	+1.14	+4.28	+13.83	+15.64
max	+19.65	+2.67	+4.05	+11.41	+33.19	+37.99
min	+2.12	-2.56	-1.01	+0.6	+3.04	+3.28



## Heterogeneity of productivity within sectors

Same  $\{\rho, \varphi\}$ , redo middle and inner loops

From 2006 parameterization, move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline $\theta = 0.25$	$\theta = 0.125$	$\theta = 0.17$	$\theta = 0.3$
mean	+8.00	+3.60	+5.15	+9.74
max	+19.65	+10.34	+13.56	+23.20
min	+2.12	0	+0.93	+2.45

# Heterogeneity of alpha within sectors

- Aggregation bias in skill intensities: Feenstra 2010
- $\alpha_j(\omega) = \min \{ \bar{\alpha}_j \exp(\varepsilon), 1 \}$
- $\varepsilon \sim \ln \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\alpha)$
- Stronger H-O mechanism (now also operates within sector)
- If impose  $\varphi = 0$ , exporters exhibit *low*  $h/l$  in high  $s/w$  countries
  - ▶ *Negative* elasticity of firm's skill intensity to firm's sales

## Heterogeneity of alpha within sectors

- $\alpha_j(\omega) = \min \{ \max \{ 0, \bar{\alpha}_j \exp(\varepsilon) \}, 1 \}, \varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma_\alpha)$
- Redo outer, middle and inner loops
  - ▶ Require lower  $\rho$  (more within reallocation)
- From 2006 parameterization, move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline			
	$\sigma_\alpha = 0$	$\sigma_\alpha = 0.05$	$\sigma_\alpha = 0.1$	$\sigma_\alpha = 0.2$
St. dev log $h/l$ : (median sector within) / btw	0.21	0.66	2	4.2
mean	+8.00	+8.32	+9.64	+10.84
max	+19.65	+20.26	+24.07	+28.62
min	+2.12	+2.09	+1.73	-1.67

## Elasticity of substitution across goods

Lower  $\sigma$  ↓ btw sector reallocation induced by SBT effect

Redo outer, middle and inner loops, keeping  $\eta = 2.7$ .

From 2006 parameterization, move countries to autarky, full factor mobility, change in skill premium (%)

	Baseline $\sigma = \eta = 2.7$	$\sigma = 2.2$ $\eta = 2.7$ BW 3 digits	$\sigma = 1$ $\eta = 2.7$	$\sigma = 1$ $\eta = 2.7$ base $\rho$ ( $\hat{\rho} = 1.38$ )
mean	+8.00	+6.94	+3.96	+6.24
max	+19.65	+17.9	+12.10	+18.21
min	+2.12	+1.53	-0.3	+0.3

# Skill premium decomposition

- Define:

- ▶  $L_{k,i}$  = employment of factor  $k$  in country  $i$
- ▶  $L_{k,in}(j)$  = employment of  $k$  in country  $i$  sector  $j$  used in goods bound for country  $n$
- ▶  $w_{k,i}$  avg wage paid to factor  $k$  in country  $i$
- ▶  $FCT_i(k) = \sum_j \sum_n \left[ L_{k,in}(j) - L_{k,ii}(j) \frac{\Lambda_{ni}(j)}{\Lambda_{ii}(j)} \frac{w_{k,ii}(j)}{w_{k,i}} \right]$ 
  - ★  $w_{k,ii}(j)$  = wage paid to factor  $k$  employed in sector  $j$  used to supply domestic mkt
  - ★  $\Lambda_{ni}(j)$  share of  $i$ 's expenditure in sector  $j$  from country  $n$
- ▶  $\Phi_i(k) = \sum_j [w_{k,ii}(j) L_{k,ii}(j)] / \Lambda_{ii}(j)$

- Accounting identity  $L_{k,i} = \sum_j \sum_n L_{k,in}(j)$  implies

$$w_{k,i} L_{k,i} = w_{k,i} FCT_i(k) + \Phi_i(k)$$

# Skill premium decomposition


- Can express  $\Phi_i(k)$  and  $FCT_i(k)$  as

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi_i(k) &= \sum_j \lambda_{ii}(j) \alpha_{k,ii}(j) E_i(j) \\ w_{k,i} FCT_i(k) &= \sum_{j,n} \left[ \begin{array}{c} \alpha_{k,in}(j) \lambda_{in}(j) \Lambda_{in}(j) E_n(j) \\ - \alpha_{k,ii}(j) \lambda_{ii}(j) \Lambda_{ni}(j) E_i(j) \end{array} \right]\end{aligned}$$

- ▶  $\alpha_{k,in}(j)$  = share of factor payments paid to  $k$ , in  $j$  prodn bound for  $n$
- ▶  $\lambda_{in}(j)$  = share of  $i$  sales in country  $n$  in sector  $j$  paid to all factors
- ▶  $E_n(j)$  =  $n$ 's expenditure in  $j$
- If  $\alpha_{k,in}(j)$  and  $\lambda_{in}(j)$  fixed across destinations  
 $\Rightarrow FCT_i(k) = \sum_j L_{k,i}(j) \omega_i(j)$ 
  - ▶  $\omega_i(j) = (\text{Net Exp}_i(j)) / (\text{Rev}_i(j))$
  - ▶  $\Rightarrow$  Component 1 easily measured using sector-level data
- If  $\lambda_{ii}(j)$  and  $\alpha_{k,ii}(j)$  fixed and  $E_i(j) / E_i(j')$  fixed  $\Rightarrow$   
 $\Rightarrow$  Component 2 constant across equilibria





# Do H/L's play large role in shaping bilateral exports?

- Set  $H_n/L_n = H_{world}/L_{world}$  for all  $n$ , keep  $H_n + L_n = 1$
- Other parameters (incl. calibrated  $t_n$ ,  $T_n$ ,  $\tau_{in}$ ) unchanged



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







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
- Set  $H_n/L_n = H_{world}/L_{world}$  for all  $n$ , keep  $H_n + L_n = 1$
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► back to trade flows




# From autarky to baseline: strength of H-O

Skill bias, high prctivity dispersion,  $\tau_n=0$ : correl change skill premium &  $H/L = 0.04$




# From autarky to baseline: strength of H-O

Skill bias, low prctivity dispersion,  $\tau_n=0$ : correl change skill premium &  $H/L = 0.60$




# Target moment 4: Alternative parameterizations

Skill bias



# 10% fall in trade costs from baseline parameterization

Real wages: large difference between skilled & unskilled workers



## Costs and prices

- Let  $c_{ink}(\omega, j)$  denote  $\tau_{in} \times$  the unit cost of production of the  $k$ 'th most productive  $(\omega, j)$  firm in country  $i$

$$c_{ink}(\omega, j) = \frac{\tau_{in}}{A_i(j)} \left[ \alpha_j z^{\frac{\rho}{2} + \rho - 1} s_i^{1-\rho} + (1 - \alpha_j) z^{\rho - 1 - \frac{\rho}{2}} w_i^{1-\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$$

where  $z$  is the productivity of this firm

- Denote  $1^{st}$ - and  $2^{nd}$ -lowest costs of supplying  $(\omega, j)$  to  $n$  by

$$C_{1n}(\omega, j) = \min_i \{c_{in1}(\omega, j)\}$$

$$C_{2n}(\omega, j) = \min \left\{ c_{i^*n2}, \min_{i \neq i^*} \{c_{in1}(\omega, j)\} \right\}$$

where  $i^*$  satisfies  $C_{1n}(\omega, j) = c_{i^*n1}(\omega, j)$

- Price of  $(\omega, j)$  in country  $n$  is

$$p_n(\omega, j) = \min \left\{ C_{2n}(\omega, j), \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} C_{1n}(\omega, j) \right\}$$

# The strength of the mechanisms

What determines strength of H-O mechanism?

- If  $\varphi = 0$ , then only H-O mechanism is active
- Assume marginal cost pricing;  $i = 1, 2$ ;  $j = x, y$ ; &  $\sigma = \rho = 1$ 
  - ▶ Let  $i = 1$  have comparative advantage in skill-intensive sector  $x$

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- **Proposition:** Rise (fall) in  $s_1/w_1$  ( $s_2/w_2$ ) caused by moving from autarky to fixed trade share decreasing in  $\theta$  & increasing in  $A_1(x) A_2(y) / [A_1(y) A_2(x)]$
- **Intuition 1:** Higher  $\theta \Rightarrow$  firm productivities more dispersed  
 $\Rightarrow$  in relative firm costs,  $z$  more important vs.  $A_i(j)$  and wages  
 $\Rightarrow$  comparative advantage mitigated  
 $\Rightarrow$  less btw sector reallocation  $\Rightarrow$  smaller wage changes



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- **Intuition 2:** Higher  $A_1(x) A_2(y) / [A_1(y) A_2(x)]$  strengthens 1's comparative advantage in  $x$   
 $\Rightarrow$  more btw sector reallocation  $\Rightarrow$  bigger wage changes

# The strength of the mechanisms

## Skill-biased technology and trade

- If  $\varphi > 0$  then skill-biased technology and trade interact

$$\frac{h}{l} = \left( \frac{w_i}{s_i} \right)^\rho \frac{\alpha_j}{1 - \alpha_j} z^\varphi$$

- What shapes the strength of this mechanism?
  - ▶  $\frac{h(z')}{l(z')} \bigg/ \frac{h(z)}{l(z)}$  is increasing in  $\varphi$  for all  $z' > z$
  - ▶ avg difference btw expanding  $z'$  & contracting  $z$  increasing in  $\theta$
- Shown quantitatively: strength of mechanism  $\uparrow$  in  $\theta$  and  $\varphi$

# Skill Intensities

- Five most and least skill-intensive merchandise sectors

<b>Most skill intensive</b>	<b>Intensity</b>
Pharma. & medicine manuf.	.611
Aerospace product and parts manuf.	.561
Computer and peripheral equip. manuf.	.553
Commun., audio, & video equip. manuf.	.465
Forestry except logging	.455

<b>Least skill intensive</b>	<b>Intensity</b>
Logging	.040
Animal slaughtering, processing	.073
Fiber, yarn, and thread mills	.075
Carpets and rug mills	.085
Turned product, screw, nut, bolt manuf.	.086

## Inner loop: factor prices and profit shares

**Inner loop**  $k_l$ : given  $\varphi, \theta, \rho, \tau, T_n, t_n$

- Initial guesses  $\{w_n, s_n, \pi_n\}$  from inner loop  $(k_l - 1)$
- Solve for
  - ▶  $P_n Q_n = \left( w_n L_n^d + s_n H_n^d \right) (1 + \pi_n) \left( 1 - n x_n^d \right)$
  - ▶  $p_n(\omega, j), \mathbb{I}_{in}(\omega, j), P_n(j), P_n \Leftarrow$  price equations
  - ▶  $Q_n, q_n(\omega, j) \Leftarrow$  price and demand equations
  - ▶  $y_n(\omega, j), l_n(\omega, j), h_n(\omega, j) \Leftarrow$  production fcn,  $h/l, q_n(\omega, j), \mathbb{I}_{in}(\omega, j)$

▶ Back to inner loop