Recherche en cours

  • REVISÉ "Follow the Money! Combining Household and Firm-Level Evidence to Unravel the Tax Elasticity of Dividends", avec Laurent Bach, Brice Fabre, Arthur Guillouzouic, Claire Leroy et Clément Malgouyres. [document de travail PSE, HAL]

  • We estimate behavioral responses to dividend taxation using recent French reforms: a rate hike and, five years later, a cut. Exploiting tax data at household and firm-level as well as data linking firms and shareholders, we find very large dividend tax elasticities to both reforms. Individuals who control firms adjust dividend receipts instantaneously, accounting for most of the aggregate dividend reaction. Investment is insensitive to dividend taxation. Dividend adjustments are instead driven by corporate saving, as owner-managers treat firms as low-tax saving vehicles. Corporate profits decline following dividend tax increases, suggesting firms also serve as tax-free consumption vehicles. Our results fit the 'new view' of dividend taxation, provided an additional low-tax yet costly payout option is available that offers a tax arbitrage opportunity to entrepreneurs in control of their firms.

  • REVISÉ "Does Tax-Benefit Linkage Matter for the Incidence of Social Security Contributions?", avec Thomas Breda, Julien Grenet et Arthur Guillouzouic.

  • We study the earnings responses to three large increases in employer Social Security contributions (SSCs) in France. We find evidence of full pass-through to workers in the case of a strong and salient relationship between contributions and expected benefits. By contrast, we find limited pass-through of employer SSCs to wages for reforms that increased SSCs with no tax-benefit linkage. Together with a meta-analysis of the literature, we interpret these results as evidence that tax-benefit linkage and its salience matter for incidence, a claim long made by the literature but not backed by direct empirical evidence to date.

  • NOUVEAU "Escape or Play Again? How Retiring Entrepreneurs Respond to the Wealth Tax", avec Laurent Bach, Arthur Guillouzouic, et Clément Malgouyres.

  • Using an exhaustive panel of French income and wealth taxpayers, we find that entrepreneurs pay far more wealth taxes once they retire. Despite this, entrepreneurs do not leave France more often than high-wage employees upon retirement. Rather, retired entrepreneurs reinvest part of the proceeds from the sale of their business into tax-favored angel investments.

  • PROCHAINEMENT "Do Billionaires Pay Taxes?", avec Laurent Bach, Arthur Guillouzouic et Clément Malgouyres.

  • This paper estimates the top of the income and wealth distribution in France and provides new measures of the tax rates faced by high income and wealthy households due the wealth tax. We assemble new data that links people to the businesses they own which allows us to reconstruct precisely the value of business assets at the top and the income derived from them (whether or not they appear on household oncome tax returns). We show that business assets and the associated income are very concentrated. We find that the French wealth tax was associated with effective tax rates much lower than the nominal rates. This discrepency is driven by two features of the design of the wealth tax: the exemption of business assets from the tax base and the ceiling mechanism which was based on taxable income.