Olivier Compte

Economic Theory Chair

Paris School of Economics

Research: auctions, bargaining, repeated games, economics and psychology, bounded rationality, decision theory

Teaching: Game theory (M1) Bargaining (M2) Plausible theories of behavior (M2)

Contact: compte@enpc.fr  olivier.compte@gmail.com



New Book

Ignorance and Uncertainty (with Andrew Postlewaite), 2018 (on-line) Econometric Society Monograph, Cambridge University Press
Access   Selected Cartoons and Chapters

Published papers




Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling? (with Laurent Lamy and Emmanuel Laurent) 2016, Revue Economique

Plausible Cooperation (with Andrew Postlewaite), 2015, Games and Economic Behavior

The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution (with Philippe Jehiel), 2010, Econometrica

Bargaining and Majority Rules: A collective search Perspective (with Philippe Jehiel), 2010, Journal of Political Economy

Veto constraint in Mechanism design: Inefficiency with correlated types (with Philippe Jehiel), 2008, American Economic Journal: Micro.

Auctions and Information acquisition : Sealed-bid or dynamic formats ? (with Philippe Jehiel), 2007, Rand Journal of Economics.

On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design (with Philippe Jehiel), 2007 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract : A Screening Perspective (with Philippe Jehiel), 2007 International Journal of Industrial Organization

The Wait and See Option in Ascending Auctions (with Philippe Jehiel), 2004, Journal of the European Economic Association

Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution games (with Philippe Jehiel), 2004, Review of Economic Studies

Confidence Enhanced performance (with Andrew Postlewaite), 2004, American Economic Review

Corruption and Competition in Procurement (with Ariane Lambert and Thierry Verdier) 2004 Rand Journal of Economics

Voluntary Contributions to a joint Project : The asymmetric case (with Philippe Jehiel) 2003 Journal of Economic Theory

On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions, (2002) (with Philippe Jehiel), Econometrica

On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations, 2002, Journal of Economic Theory

On Failing to Cooperate when Monitoring is Private, 2002, Journal of Economic Theory

On the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties, (2002) (with Philippe Jehiel), Econometrica

Collusion, Mergers and Capacity Constraints, (2002) (with Frédéric Jenny and Patrick Rey), European Economic Review ,46, 1-29

Bargaining while Searching for Outside Options: A Potential Role for Unions, (with Philippe Aghion and Philippe Jehiel) European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (1998).

Communication in Repeated games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (Econometrica, may 1998, p.597-626)

International negotiations and dispute resolution mechanisms: the case of environmental negotiations (with Philippe Jehiel) (1997) in International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues ed. Carlo Carraro Edward Elgar.

  Working papers    






Bounded Rationality

Cautiousness (with Andy Postlewaite), 2012

Plausible Theories of Behavior (with Andrew Postlewaite), 2011

Simple Auctions (with Andrew Postlewaite), 2013, 2012
Earlier version: Auction notes, 2010

Belief Formation (with Andrew Postlewaite) 2012
Earlier version: Mental processes and decision making, 2010

Plausible cooperation (joint with Andrew Postlewaite), 2012, 2010
Earlier version: Repeated games with limited information processing

Prediction errors and the winner’s curse, 2004 download
Early versions: The winner’s curse with independent values
2001 2002

Repeated Games

Belief free equilibria (with Andy Postlewaite), 2013

Folk Theorems (with Andy Postlewaite), 2013


Group Decisions (with Philippe Jehiel)

On the Optimal Majority Rule (with Philippe Jehiel) download

Inefficiencies in Bargaining : departing from Myerson Satterthwaite and Akerlof (with Philippe Jehiel)

Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences (with Philippe Jehiel)

Multi-party negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

When outside options force concessions to be gradual (with Philippe Jehiel)
1994 version: On the role of arbitration in negotiations


Voluntary Participation and Reassignment in Two-sided Matching (joint with Philippe Jehiel) download


Credible Threats, Reputation and Private Monitoring.

Secret Price Cutting : an illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic